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A New Pathway To Enhance the Global
Nuclear Security Regime? Lessons Learned
from Southeast Asia
Francesca Giovannini
American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Abstract
The paper investigates the approach used by a new set of regional institutions, the Disaster Preparedness
and Risk Management Organizations (DPRMOs), in strengthening regional governance and cooperation.
It also inquires in what ways these new institutions might indirectly contribute to the establishment of a
more cohesive global nuclear security framework. More specifically, through the examination of the case
of Southeast Asia, the paper argues that these institutions, albeit without a specific and direct mandate to
operate in the nuclear security domain, are fundamentally strengthening states’ capacity to assess risks
and threats and to map vulnerabilities in timely fashion. They are also encouraging the development of a
tight information-sharing network to allow countries to harmonize their preventive and management
responses to disasters (both natural and man-made).
The approach used by these organizations might well complement the current approach to nuclear
security which came into being with the launch of the UN Resolution 1540 and the global initiatives that
followed suit. To be successful, the paper asserts, the current approach relies on the expectation that states
will be willing to undertake significant changes in their political, economic and social institutional
infrastructures so as to tackle the underlying causes of vulnerability to nuclear terrorism. Yet this current
approach does not seem to provide states with the ultimate rationale for underwriting these
comprehensive changes within their domestic institutional landscape mostly because the threat of nuclear
terrorism is defined in universal terms, independent of each state’s unique context.
The approach offered by DPRMOs instead departs from the fundamental premise that countries will
respond to risks and threats with adequate resources only if and when they become aware of their internal
vulnerabilities to such risks. This model therefore supports the national-level development of accurate and
rigorous risk assessments on which state responses will be later designed.
The topic of this paper is particularly timely. The nuclear security agenda has attracted considerable
attention worldwide, galvanized countries and nuclear agencies, and gathered momentum through the
Nuclear Security Summits. Yet in parallel to this record of successful achievements, nuclear security has
also attracted resistance, skepticism, and overall obstructionism by some countries that have perceived it
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as a means for the United States to restrict emerging markets from gaining access to nuclear technology.
Even more worrisome, the reaction of regional organizations to the nuclear security agenda has been
lukewarm at best. Regions and their institutions have a fundamental role to play in ensuring that nuclear
security becomes one of the fundamental pillars of good nuclear governance, but the underdeveloped
regional dimension of nuclear security governance is a significant problem. It has been widely
acknowledged that nuclear security risks are fundamentally collective problems emanating from weak
border control, frail export control policies, and insufficient regional security regulations. In some
regional contexts, such as in South America and in Southeast Asia, regional organizations have offered
poor leadership but often have been paralyzed by internal political disputes among member states
supporting the nuclear security agenda and others opposing it.
The new collective approach that DPRMOs are offering will greatly strengthen collaboration and regional
governance and will ultimately solidify national nuclear security policies.

I.

Introduction

Since the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, the world has been engaged in an all-out struggle to
mitigate and respond to the threats posed by terrorist organizations.
In the nuclear realm, a flurry of initiatives has led to the expansion of existing treaties and the creation of
new institutions. For instance, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(CPPNM)1 that entered into force in 1980 was further strengthened in 2005 by the adoption of an
amendment that extends the responsibilities of the state to protect nuclear material during use and
storage, as well as transport. In addition, a wide range of new institutional mechanisms, including the
UN Resolution 1540, the Nuclear Security Summits, and informal partnerships such as the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), among others, were all established in a fairly short time
to provide binding rules and voluntary guidelines for countries to adopt adequate regulations and policies in
defense of their nuclear material and infrastructures. Concurrently, states have responded positively to
these multilateral incentives by taking stock of their ability to protect nuclear facilities and material
through enhancing export control regulations, physical protection of their nuclear plants, and adopting
more rigorous screenings of personnel working within these facilities.
The nuclear security regime that has arisen from multinational and domestic efforts encompasses and
combines elements of hard and soft law, and operates at different levels of governance2. The eclectic
and inconsistent institutional architecture that characterizes the nuclear security regime at present is
frequently described as a “patchwork quilt of voluntary commitments, national laws and international
conventions” [5].

1

The convention that entered into force in 1980 was the first treaty explicitly drafted to address the problem of protecting
nuclear material. Yet the language of the convention was purposefully left vague and its mandate was limited to the protection of
nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport.
2 Some definitions: (1) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines “nuclear security” as “the prevention and
detection of and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear
material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities” [1]. (2) This paper uses the concept of regime defined by
Stephen Krasner as “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a
given issue-area.”[2]. (3) “Soft law” can be defined as “rules of conduct which in principle have no legally binding force, but
which nevertheless may have practical effects.” [3]. (4) The IAEA defines the “global nuclear security framework” as a
framework that “encompasses, inter alia, the binding and non-binding international legal instruments, nuclear security guidance
developed and documents published by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the Nuclear Security Series (NSS) and the
mechanisms for their application and use.” [4].
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The absence of a comprehensive framework that “would stipulate specific nuclear security standards,” [6]
according to experts, might ultimately undermine the ability of the regime to credibly and effectively
confront the challenge of nuclear terrorism.
A report recently released by the Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG) claims that
“The current nuclear security regime is not robust, adaptable or coherent enough to adequately protect
against the intensifying and evolving threats posed by nuclear terrorism in the twenty-first century.
The governance system for nuclear security is in need of significant improvement in three areas: greater
coherence and confirmed effectiveness, enhanced transparency, and increased international confidence
including through shared assessments of performance and cooperation. The current nuclear security
regime has improved over time but this evolution has been too slow and is incomplete. It relies
primarily on opaque national structures and voluntary commitments to prevent nuclear and radiological
terrorism. While there are a limited number of binding international agreements covering aspects of
nuclear security, adherence to them is incomplete, assessing compliance is difficult and they leave
significant gaps in the system” [7].
In addition, trends seem to suggest that even at the domestic level, the momentum once gained towards
the adoption and implementation of regulations has waned and possibly come to a halt. The most
recent report from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), for instance, notes that: “Since 2014 no
improvements have been made in the core protection and control measures assessed by the NTI Index,
including on-site physical protection, control and accounting procedures, the ability to mitigate the
insider threat, physical security during transport and response capabilities” [8].
Based on these current assessments, this paper argues that while focused efforts to strengthen existing
nuclear security institutions should continue, it is advisable for the international community
concurrently to support and validate alternative institutions and governance processes that, albeit not
explicitly linked to nuclear security, might nonetheless provide much needed support to the
consolidation of nuclear security rules. Most specifically the paper claims that disaster preparedness
and risk management organizations (henceforth DPRMOs) that are now flourishing all over the world 3,
predominantly at the regional level, might bear critical impact on improving the conditions for the
development of a comprehensive framework for nuclear security in the future.
DPRMOs’ main goal is to foster and encourage transparency, accountability, and facilitate information
sharing among member states in the prevention and management of natural disasters. Furthermore,
DPRMOs help countries to acquire individually and collectively the capacities needed to conduct
scientific and rigorous security risks and vulnerabilities of their security apparatus. They also establish
channels and platforms for information and knowledge-sharing that might be helpful for advancing
cooperation in nuclear security. Moreover, they help advance the norm of collective security that poses
significant constraints to national sovereignty when the greater good, such as effective security for all
persons, is in jeopardy. In short, DPRMOs are helping to set up the foundations for more effective and
binding regional governance on which future nuclear security efforts can rest.
Although DPRMOs are currently limiting their mandate to the prevention of and response to natural
disasters, the framework they espouse might ultimately foster conditions for the establishment of a more
cohesive global nuclear security regime. The purpose of this paper is to explain why and how.

3

This paper defines disaster preparedness and risk management as a process by which an association of states agree to cooperate
on reducing the vulnerability of its regional community to hazards [9]. This can include the full disaster cycle spectrum—
preparedness, prevention response and recovery—or only some parts of it. A regional disaster preparedness program includes any
type of formal agreement within a regional organization that specifically deals with at least one of the four features of the disaster
cycle mentioned above.
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Two caveats are in order here. This paper is interested in assessing how the approach adopted by a new
set of institutions, such as DPRMOs, might eventually create conditions that could ultimately contribute
to the establishment of a more cohesive nuclear security regime. The paper does not offer any analysis on
how DPRMOs contribute to solutions for specific nuclear security challenges, such as enhancing physical
protection or addressing the insider threats problem. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the
institutions the paper deals with are too new to allow the effectiveness of their approach for the global
regime of nuclear security governance to be assessed empirically. However, a few general points on
effectiveness are offered at the end of the paper for future research to consider.
The paper examines DPRMOs operating in Southeast Asia. In my view, Southeast Asia is a microcosm of
the rest of the world, encompassing the challenges and constraints that must be overcome by states in
their attempt to deepen and strengthen the global nuclear security regime. Firstly, Southeast Asia is,
together with the Gulf Region, the area in which the spread of nuclear technology is occurring most
rapidly. This means new countries with relatively little nuclear knowledge will have to put in place
regulations and policies to tame the risk of nuclear terrorism. Getting nuclear security right in this part of
the world has global consequences and significant security repercussions. Second, and related to the
previous point, states in Southeast Asia have dealt with in the past, and continue to deal with, terrorist
organizations either operating in their territories or in neighboring countries. Although this first-hand
experience should make these countries overall more generally aware of the severity of nuclear terrorism
threats, it has also forced countries to be more cautious in fully embracing a nuclear security agenda that
has been seen as explicitly advanced by the United States. Finally, the region struggles with
overwhelming development needs, growing population, and rapid political and social changes that
frequently overshadow security concerns and lower nuclear security as a political priority. Identifying
ways in which the development and the security agenda are linked would ensure a more enduring
commitment towards nuclear security.
The paper is structured as follows: in the first section, I provide an overview of the current approach to
nuclear security governance and its main shortcomings. The second section explores the features of the
contingency approach to nuclear security as it is advanced by DPRMOs. The third section offers an
empirical illustration of how nuclear security is “applied” in Southeast Asia. The fourth and final section
examines the prospects for the further engagement of DPRMOs in the nuclear security area and argues
why the two approaches ought to be integrated in a holistic fashion. In its conclusive section, this paper
argues that the legalistic and contingency approaches to nuclear security are certainly not mutually
exclusive; rather they are reinforcing each other in a synergistic fashion.

II.

What is the problem? The Status of Global Nuclear
Security Governance

Although concerns over nuclear terrorism did not begin on September 11, 2001, the attacks instilled
a revived sense of urgency to tackle the problem and renewed the commitment among states to work
collaboratively to find a viable solution.
The adoption of the Franco-American-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1540 crystallized the
understanding that nuclear terrorism ought to be a collective concern for the entire international
community. To ensure universal collaboration, UN Resolution 1540 obliges all states “to refrain from
providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.” More
importantly, it demands states “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any nonState actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons and their means of delivery” [10] Two types of laws are considered critical in
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the fight against nuclear terrorism: border control regulations and export control laws4, both of which
are now a legal responsibility of each state under UN Resolution 1540.
In addition to UNSC Resolution 1540 and the adoption of the aforementioned Amendment to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 2005, a string of other informal governance
initiatives has been advanced by the U.S. in partnership with other states to strengthen international
responses to nuclear terrorism. For example, in 2006, the Russian and U.S. governments launched the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which aims to strengthen the capacities of
signatory member states in the fight against nuclear terrorism [12]. The initiative calls on states to
voluntarily adopt and implement the principles promoted by the initiative by incorporating those
principles into their national legislation.
In more recent years, the nuclear security agenda has attracted further political traction under President
Barack Obama, who has made it one of the central tenets of his foreign policy in the past eight years. In
his historical speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama stated that one of the main goals for the
international community should be “to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world, within
four years” [13]. This commitment was further strengthened by UNSC Resolution 1887, adopted in a
special session chaired by President Obama himself. Echoing the president’s position, in October 2009
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that “a nuclear terrorist bomb detonated anywhere in the
world would have vast economic political, ecological and social consequences everywhere in the world”
[14] and for a short period of time, the U.S. Administration began to cast nuclear security as the
“fourth, and missing, pillar of the NPT” [13].
Since 2010, the U.S. has led the convening of Nuclear Security Summits “to raise international awareness
of nuclear terrorism to develop a consensus on the threat and to secure a set of specific commitments from
participants” [15]. During the summits, states have been expected to make national commitments in a
multilateral setting, thus emphasizing the interdependence of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and
non-compliant or governance-weak countries.
In spite of the flurry of initiatives, it is common opinion among nuclear pundits to define the current
global nuclear security regime as inadequate and dissatisfactory, especially when it is compared to other
regimes such as the nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear safety regimes, both resting on binding and
almost universal treaties.
Matthew Bunn at Harvard described the current situation as follows: “Currently we have no international
standards that specify what levels of security nuclear weapons, plutonium or HEU should have; no
regular international mechanisms for verification or transparency to build confidence that states are
putting effective nuclear security in place, no forum for continuing high level discussion of nuclear
security after the summit process comes to an end. In addition, the current patchwork of nuclear security
agreements and initiatives is clearly insufficient but because of geopolitics the efforts to negotiate
new treaties are unlikely to succeed in a timely way” [16].
Along the same lines, a Stanley Foundation Report observed that the “essence of the nuclear
In Article 3.C, the Resolution calls all states to “develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law
enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit
trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with
international law.” In Article 3.D, instead, all states are expected to “establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective
national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit,
trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as
financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and
enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations.”[11]
4
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security challenge is preventing weak links in the international system that can be exploited for
malicious purposes. The challenge is to identify and fix these weak links when the international nuclear
security system emphasizes national responsibility, has no binding obligations and lacks effective
mechanisms for transnational information exchange” [7].
Finally, the NTI Report argues that: “The existing nuclear security legal foundation remains weak. In
addition to the CPPNM and its 2005 amendments, The International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) commits states to criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism and to
cooperate in bringing those who commit such crimes to justice. However neither agreement is
universally observed or implemented” [8].
The criticism towards the presumed weakness of the global nuclear security regime should be put into
context. It is fair to say that; overall, the world has made outstanding progress in its collective fight against
nuclear terrorism. Much needed training to security personnel has been provided5, monitoring systems
have been designed and adopted6, and “more than half of all the countries in the world where
weapons- usable nuclear material once existed have eliminated it” [17]. In addition, it is worth noting that
the last Nuclear Security Summit convened in Washington reached a historical landmark: the Amendment
to the CPPNM will allow it to finally enter into force thanks to the number of ratifications received. This
success, together with other remarkable achievements ought to be celebrated and capitalized on [16].
Nevertheless, the main critique of global nuclear security governance is that it lacks a cohesive
framework for action, enforcement and implementation.
The IAEA has defined an effective global nuclear security framework as a structure that “requires all
states to recognize the importance of the legal framework – those with active nuclear programs and those
conducing more limited nuclear activities. Any state may be a transit country, with or without nuclear or
radiological activities” [4]. Yet such recognition is difficult to be achieved when “the legal framework is
built on several international legal instruments Accordingly global effectiveness requires states’
adherence to, and implementation of all relevant legal instruments. The sovereign rights of states in
relation to their acceptance or not of international treaties may delay the establishment of a
common universal foundation for nuclear security” [4].
The Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG) in a similar sentiment has noted that:
“There is no uniformity in the nuclear security regime today and this creates vulnerabilities. The nuclear
security regime is typically understood to comprise domestic laws and regulations that govern security
within a country’s territory; international agreements, institutions, and United Nations (UN) resolutions
that supplement national laws; and ad hoc, cooperative measures in which countries voluntarily
participate. This patchwork of agreements, resolutions, regulations, and guidelines was adopted in
different forums, at different times, by different countries, and with different accountability measures”
[18].
The impulse towards a more coherent and universal nuclear security regime is understandable and
desirable as this regime would constrain states’ behavior, increase accountability and transparency, and
5

For instance the IAEA has provided 150 assessment missions to help member states enhancing their national system for
accounting and control of nuclear material, for improving their detection and response system and for evaluation existing
physical protection arrangements at the facilities. In addition during 2002-2012, the IAEA has trained more than 13,800 persons
in some 120 nations and with the help of member-states has established the International Network for Nuclear Security Training
and Support Centers that today counts more than 75 members [4].
6 For instance, the IAEA has provided member states with over 700 instruments for ensuring the nuclear security of major public
events, 386 instruments including personal radiation detectors and other devises, 21 remote monitoring systems were deployed to
guarantee the automatic notification of national response forces [4].
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reduce uncertainty among the members of the international community. Conversely, a fragmented
regime might allow states to resort to forum shopping [19–21] that is to say “the existence of distinct
negotiating for a will spur actors to seek out the forum most favorable to their interests” [20]. States
may also seek to cooperate in the forums (or according to the standards) that display the weakest
compliance and enforcement mechanisms [22], thus instigating a potential race-to-the- bottom between
states, ultimately affecting international transparency and accountability.
Yet regime cohesiveness and coherences are hard goals to achieve, as they require states to accept and
abide by more stringent rules. Challenges to their attainment exist both at the domestic and international
levels. Domestic actors might be willing to play a role in contributing to a more cohesive nuclear
security framework by accepting more stringent rules only if they believe that such a framework will
secure the fulfillment of their specific domestic interests [23]. But several factors might weaken their
political will.
A newly released NTI report identifies some domestic factors that conventionally plague further
progress on nuclear security: 1) lack of public engagement [24]; 2) bureaucratic inertia [17]: after
treaties enter into force, the incentives to continue to improve the system decline and other priorities take
precedence; 3) lack of dedicated resources; and 4) local culture and values7.
In addition, the adoption of a more cohesive framework for global nuclear security would rest on specific
and favorable geo-political conditions. First and foremost, it requires good will and cooperation among
great powers. The current patchwork nature of the global nuclear security regime is in large part due to
the desire among great powers to exercise direct control and influence over the governance of
nuclear security by establishing institutions aligned with their own interest8. For instance, it is worth
noting that UN Resolution 1540 was sponsored by France and the United States and was followed only
two years later by the launch of the Russia-U.S. co-led initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).
The role that power has played and will continue to play in shaping and carving the governance
architecture of nuclear security should not be underestimated. Moreover, the current moment does not
seem to provide conditions conducive to the achievement of a more comprehensive framework for
nuclear security. The mounting competition between the United States and Russia poses a significant
hurdle to overcome. It is worth remembering that according to the 2016 NTI report, there has been an
increase in the stock of weapons-usable nuclear material among states and that one reason for this is the
2013 ending of the “U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement, which was responsible for a large portion of
declining global stocks of highly enriched uranium” [24]. Given the current status of the relationship
between the two nuclear powers, it is unlikely that a renewal of such an agreement will take place any
time soon. In addition, and most recently, Russia boycotted the Nuclear Security Summit, weakening the
Summit’s impact and the prospect for the adoption of more binding treaties in the future [27].

7

In the current approach, international organizations and powerful players define the threat of nuclear terrorism and its likelihood
a priori. Results and recommendations then trickle down to regional groupings and individual countries. Yet this one-size-fits-all
approach fails to acknowledge that countries with different cultures and geographies may operate with vastly different risk
thresholds and appreciation of the “urgency” of the threat.
8 The concept of how great powers shape international institutions has been developed mostly by neo-realist IR scholars such as
John Mearsheimer who contends that: essentially, institutions are “arenas for acting out power relationships” [25] p.13. The role
of power in international politics is also examined by neo-liberal IR scholars such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who argue
that is one of the critical variables shaping state’s behavior and institutional choices, yet power is not the only determinant.
Interdependence among countries in the form of aligned interests equally leads to specific multilateral arrangements and
institutional outcomes [23, 26].
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III. A new path to global nuclear security governance?
Direct efforts towards the articulation of a global nuclear security framework should continue. However,
given the current global challenges, it is equally important for the international community to identify and
support alternative governance mechanisms that might enhance states’ responses to nuclear terrorism,
albeit indirectly.
At the regional level, institutional innovation has led to the establishment of new forms of multilateral
arrangements and organizations. This work might provide an important opportunity to improve nuclear
security governance at the regional and global level.
A study conducted by the Brookings Institute released in 2013 ascertained that “regional organizations are
growing in number expanding in scope and becoming more active in many areas – from free trade
agreements to cooperative initiatives on resources management to counter-terrorism measures” [28], and
that “one particular area where regional organizations seem to be playing a leading role is in the
relationship between migration and climate change … with growing recognition of the potential effects of
climate change, regional organizations are becoming aware that they have particular roles to play in
policy discussions. Regions are more likely to face similar environmental phenomena and hazards and if
people are forced to leave their countries because of the effects of climate change, they are likely to turn
first to nearby countries” [28].
Thanks to the strengthening of regional cooperation in this field, today there are “more than 30 regional
organizations involved in disaster risk management” [28].
DPRMOs work through an innovative approach that, if applied to also prevent man-made disasters in
addition to natural ones, might help achieve three important goals in the realm of nuclear security
governance. These goals are: (1) to enhance transparency among countries, (2) to reach greater coherence
with other actors, and (3) to increase international confidence through shared assessments of threats and
performance. Attaining these goals is critically important for the ultimate establishment of a nuclear
security framework. These goals are examined in turn.
The first goal is to enhance transparency. By definition, security systems have to be private and protected
in order to be effective. However, the high level of secrecy and almost complete lack of transparency in
the field of nuclear security today need not remain standard. Matthew Bunn at Harvard argues that, “all
states should regularly publish information about their nuclear security requirements and approaches and
the means they use to assure effective performance” [16]. Yet, such a scenario is difficult to create,
particularly in regions and areas of the world that are characterized by deep mistrust, and where the statelogics of secrecy become a fundamental premise of national security. Even in more normal circumstances,
where regional competition is not acute, countries refrain from disclosing information particularly related
to existing vulnerabilities in their security apparatus and hesitate to request assistance from other
countries to avoid high reputational costs that may trigger unexpected consequences. Sharing
vulnerabilities might result in the country's loss of international prestige and credibility. Such a loss
ultimately may affect the global standing of the country in other areas also, such as trade, finance, and
high-technology manufacturing. The vicious cycle of nuclear security secrecy ultimately affects global
security in more dramatic ways. Information sharing mechanisms and collective thinking platforms allow
countries to exchange best practices and lessons learned. The almost complete absence of these systems
deepens distrust among countries, worsens the prospects for cooperation, and lowers the ability of
countries (particularly smaller and less developed ones) to develop a credible nuclear security
infrastructure. This continues to perpetuate the existence (and worsening) of weak links within the global
nuclear security system that can significantly affect everyone’s security.
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The second goal is to reach greater coherence with other actors. While the protection of nuclear
infrastructure is an important objective, the acquisition of fissile material is the most obvious path to the
creation of a terrorist improvised nuclear device [29]. Therefore, borders and export control policies are
the cornerstone to a credible nuclear security strategy. Within the current approach, the establishment,
maintenance, and strengthening of border and export control policies remain solely with the state and its
domestic jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that national policies by themselves are
necessary but not sufficient instruments to mitigate and respond to the threats of nuclear security.
Multilateral cooperation, particularly among neighboring countries and at the regional level, ought to be
seen as an indispensable part of generating the necessary political will and trust for such policies to come
about. If regional cooperation is strong from both a security and an economic standpoint, countries might
be more inclined to further cooperation on border controls and export control policies.
The third goal is to increase international confidence through shared assessments of threats and
performance. All main international conventions, agreements, and institutions, as well as the national
security strategies of individual states9, identify the threat of nuclear terrorism as the most urgent,
pressing, and critical challenge facing the international community today10. However, beyond these
statements, little is done on the ground to boost the abilities of countries to properly assess both the
threats of nuclear terrorism in their countries and the vulnerabilities of their current security systems to
such threats. International conventions demand states undertake specific changes in their legislative and
regulatory policies but ultimately leave countries full discretion on the scale and magnitude of these
institutional changes. For instance, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism vaguely commits states to “taking all practicable measures, including if necessary, adapting
their national law to prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories” [32]. Other similar
statements are found in the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
and Nuclear Facilities where states are expected to “establish, implement and maintain an appropriate
physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and nuclear facilities under its jurisdiction” [33].
The complete discretion left to states and the absence of credible benchmarks against which to assess
risks and threats ultimately undermines the credibility of nuclear security systems instead of fostering an
environment of international confidence. The problem is also exacerbated by the lack of guidelines for
appropriate actions that need to be taken against these identified threats. The absence of scientific
assessments of the actual threats also leaves open the possibility of “politicizing” nuclear security. The
statement released by the Head of the Malaysia delegation during the 2009 IAEA General Conference
captures well the concerns among emerging powers “against the disproportionate focus on perceived
threats to nuclear security that could result in unjustifiable denials of nuclear technology” [34] and
illustrates the skepticism about the actual threat posed by nuclear terrorism.
These goals are not technical but rather political. In order to achieve them, a vision of a political pathway
to establish a global nuclear security regime is needed. The report from the Stanley Foundation precisely
The 2010 “U.S. Nuclear Posture Review” and the 2010 “U.S. National Security Strategy” both identified nuclear terrorism as
the most urgent threat facing the United States. The former document states in its executive summary that “as President Obama
has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism” [30]. The latter document channels the view of
President Obama and his administration on the strategic security challenges that the U.S. will be tasked to face in the 21st century.
In particular it states that: “The threats to our people, our homeland, and our interests have shifted dramatically in the last 20
years. Competition among states endures, but instead of a single nuclear adversary, the United States is now threatened by the
potential spread of nuclear weapons to extremists who may not be deterred from using them” [31].
10 The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) 2005, states that: “acts of nuclear
terrorism may result in the gravest consequences and may pose a threat to international peace and security” [32]; The adoption of
the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005) is rooted in the widespread concern
among states that: “worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and by the threats posed by
international terrorism and organized crime” [33], and the United Nations Resolution 1540 (2004) notes that: “the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and
security” [11].
9
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echoes this point and states, “the central technical and consensus building roles of the IAEA appeal to
many nations and will remain part of a strengthened and integrated nuclear security regime. But a
multilateral political track on which governments can innovate and take initiative alone or in groups is
valuable and should be maintained” [7]. In addition, this architecture has to be sustainable as “it is not
enough for effective nuclear security to be achieved at one particular moment; nuclear security has to be
maintained and continually improved for decades to come” [16].
DPRMOs can tackle these weaknesses by formulating and promoting a holistic understanding of
collective security and trans-boundary security risks and by strengthening state capacities to assess risks
and vulnerabilities in an objective, scientific, and rigorous fashion.
I should note that DPRMOs currently do not have a direct mandate to address nuclear terrorism related
risks, and their mandate on man-made disaster is vaguely defined at this stage. These organizations are
also not encouraging the adoption of any specific legislation or regulatory policies that might prompt
immediate change in the current nuclear security governance landscape. However, what I suggest is that
indirectly, through their focus on disaster preparedness and risk management, DPRMOs are contributing
to the creation of the conditions that will be indispensable for the establishment of a comprehensive,
coherent, and sustainable global nuclear security regime.
The rationale underpinning the existence of DPRMOs resides in what has been called the “humanitarian
ethics of care” [35]. The purpose, mandate, and responsibilities of these organizations are ultimately to
respond to disasters and to manage risks so as to reduce the loss of lives [36]. DPRMOs are based on a
humanitarian approach that might play a role in encouraging states to disclose information and to share
lessons learned and best practices, even when sharing might not be so obviously in their national security
interest. The framework espoused by DPRMOs shifts the center of gravity from state security to people
security and right to life, subordinating national security policies to the fulfillment of humanitarian
obligations. In the conventional approach to nuclear security, a state with vulnerabilities in its nuclear
security apparatus is perceived as a weak link and a security problem within the international system. This
negative perception incentivizes the state to avoid disclosing such vulnerabilities. In the DPRMOs
framework, which revolves around state and international efforts, the vulnerability of a state is seen as a
collective humanitarian liability that ought to be disclosed and addressed.
To appreciate the difference between these two approaches, it is helpful to compare the language used in
crafting the main conventions and agreements.
In UN Resolution 1540, the responsibility is exclusively on the state. Cooperation is framed as something
desirable, but which takes place in ad-hoc circumstances. For example, Article 7 of the Resolution
mentions the possibility of cooperation and states that as “some States may require assistance in
implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories, …Invites States in a position to do
so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and
regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions”
[10].
Similarly, other nuclear security conventions at the global and regional level all emphasize nuclear
security as a national responsibility. For instance, the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism
emphasizes the national role:
Article III:
The Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent
with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of
noninterference in the internal affairs of other Parties.
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Article IV:
Preservation of Sovereignty Nothing in this Convention entitles a Party to undertake, in
the territory of another Party, the exercise of jurisdiction or performance of functions,
which are exclusively, reserved for the authorities of that other Party by its domestic laws
[37].
Yet the language used in the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
focuses on collective rather than national responsibility. Article 3, Principle 1 states that “the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and national unity of the parties shall be respected in accordance with the charter of
the United Nations” and Article 3, principle 3 states that “the parties to the agreement shall in the spirit of
solidarity and partnerships and in accordance with their respective needs capabilities and situations
strengthen cooperation and coordination to achieve the objectives of the agreement.” Most importantly,
Articles 4a and 4b clearly define disaster management as a collective responsibility whereby “the parties
shall cooperate in developing and implementing measures to reduce disaster losses including
identification of disaster risk, development of monitoring, assessment and early warning systems” and
“respond promptly to a request for relevant information sought by a member state or states” [36]. The
change is related to the particular reading of national sovereignty that the disaster approach advances. On
the one hand, this approach continues to bolster state-based responsibility but leaves open the possibility
of intervention by international actors should state responses fail [35].
Secondly, and connected to this previous point, DPRMOs can help groupings of states to reach greater
coherence in their collective security policies. This also includes those policies related to border control
and emergency response strategies. The emphasis is on adopting Standard Operating Procedures [36] that
facilitate humanitarian interventions and disaster-relief operations and on the conduction of periodic
simulation exercises. The context in which DPRMOs operate is different from the context of nuclear
security. Nonetheless, DPRMOs are helping to increase the likelihood that infrastructures will eventually
be used for other non-emergency priorities like the governance of nuclear security and the development of
more harmonized procedures for border control by helping to build regional infrastructure through
strengthening information sharing.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, DPRMOs can help states develop strong mechanisms and
instruments through which to assess risks and identify the vulnerabilities of their systems. DPRMOs “depoliticize” risks and provide a rigorous methodology for risk assessment.
The current approach to nuclear security, as explained in earlier sections of the paper, defines nuclear
terrorism as a serious threat whose gravity is articulated in a top-down approach by international
organizations and powerful states.
In the conventional approach to nuclear security, the threat of nuclear terrorism is established a priori
and, as such, it becomes both a source of controversy and a reason for complacency.
Several countries have expressed resentment towards the top-down approach embedded in several nuclear
security conventions. Matthew Bunn points out that “from the perspective of many nonaligned countries,
the nuclear-armed states pose the greatest nuclear dangers, and hence their compliance with their
disarmament obligations should be the top international nuclear priority” [17]. In addition, countries
today interested in pursuing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes might be afraid that new concerns over
nuclear terrorism translate into further barriers to access nuclear technology. The Brazil delegation at the
2010 Nuclear Security Summit expressed in an exemplary fashion this shared sentiment among nuclear
seekers by stating “nuclear security has been fundamental to the enjoyment of the benefits of nuclear
technology since the first peaceful applications of the atom. Today, we face new challenges in this area, in
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particular the risk that non-state actors, especially terrorist groups, may have access to nuclear materials
or weapons for illicit purposes. … The repudiation of terrorism is one of the ten constitutional principles,
which guide our international relations. It is important on the other hand to avoid that the legitimate
concern about nuclear terrorism jeopardizes the right to access, use and develop of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes” [38].
In these politically charged and ideologically divisive contexts, the threat is understood as objective and
static. Objective because the threat exists and its lethality is immense. Static because nuclear terrorism
will always exist, therefore protection will always be required. This formulation has helped create
coalitions of like-minded countries and identify a checklist of instruments and tools to fight the threat. It
has not, however, inspired much support from countries that understand threats as evolving, complex
challenges tied to cultural and identity factors, instead of non-state actors in a territory. Secondly, and
more importantly, although countries’ nuclear security cultures will ultimately have to be based on risk
assessment capacities, the current approach does not help countries develop this capacity. The current
approach requires states to adopt specific legislation but does not establish a sustainable system through
which states can upgrade or maintain their security systems based on the evolution of the threat itself.
In contrast, the DPRMOs’ framework helps countries develop threat assessments on which their risk
response will be ultimately designed. Because the risk-management system is both a national and a
collective responsibility (as illustrated below), countries have to conduct objective, comprehensive, and
scientifically sound assessments of their security system. The DPRMOs’ approach encourages states to
make use of scientific data and to develop a cadre of trained experts capable of producing and interpreting
those data. Ulrich Beck has argued, “Dangers do not exist in themselves. Independently of our
perceptions. They become a political issue only when everyone becomes aware of them. They are the
products of social stagings which are strategically defined, cover up and dramatized with the idea of
scientific material” [39]. The use of scientific material and data also legitimizes the state’s decision to
adopt unpopular but needed reforms in order to address these risks. The risk-prevention infrastructure that
DPRMOs supports is, therefore, far more extensive and effective than the one on which nuclear security
currently relies.

IV. Disaster Preparedness in Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia might be on the brink of its own nuclear revolution. After decades of technological
disappointment and political backpedaling, Vietnam’s decision to move forward with the construction of
its first two nuclear power plants is a turning point in the region’s history. The decision may have
potentially far-reaching consequences.
“The region is not new to disappointments however. Since 1971 five projects to build research or power
reactors in four Southeast Asian counties were cancelled or indefinitely postponed after reaching various
stages of development. Much of the early nuclear development in Southeast Asia stemmed from the U.S.
sponsored Atoms for Peace program and some countries in the region launched initial research reactors
projects in the late 50s and early 60s. In Thailand for instance the TRR-1 became operational in 1962, in
the Philippines and Vietnam in 1963 and in Indonesia in 1964” [40]
After that, however, the nuclear advancements came to a halt because of protests following the nuclear
accidents at the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, and the improbably high costs of the technology. Some
of these challenges remain present in the region, such as active and powerful anti-nuclear movements.
Nevertheless, technology transfer has become easier. Over the years, the growing credibility of many
Southeast Asian countries has renewed prospects for nuclear deals in the region, making it one of the
most promising commercial areas for the nuclear industry.
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The challenges that the region continues to confront have made the establishment of a regional nuclear
regime particularly difficult to achieve. However, strengthening nuclear security in Southeast Asia
remains a compelling global priority because of the rapid spread of nuclear power in the region and the
active presence of terrorist organizations. A report from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies eloquently illustrates the urgency of the problem, stating, “due to the increased flow of nuclear
material and radioactive sources in the region, the development of robust nuclear security capabilities in
Southeast Asia is critical. Among the key challenges for nuclear security in the region are the high level
of terrorist activity, the weak maritime security, insufficient border and export controls and scarcity of
adequately trained and supported human resources” [40].
In addition, the high level of terrorist activity in the region has attracted intense international scrutiny.
U.S. policy-makers and media, in particular, have frequently cast the region as "the second front in the
global war on terror"11 [43]. Countries throughout the region, particularly powerful countries like
Indonesia and Malaysia, still resent this title, leading to the adoption of more defensive postures against
the pressure of global institutions and external powers to undertake much needed institutional and
governance reforms.
Given the porous borders and evident vulnerabilities in the security systems of many countries in the
region, the United States considered it its highest priority to engage intensively with the region and its
member-states to enhance the regional defense infrastructures. To do so, the U.S. pursued and
consolidated military partnerships with traditional allies such as the Philippines12 and Singapore and also
lobbied ASEAN to create credible mechanisms directly oriented towards the fight against terrorism. Yet
because of the open opposition of a few states of the region, ASEAN initially delivered non-binding
conventions and declarations that dealt with terrorism-related issues at large, but maintained the sanctity
of the principle of non-interference as the basis of ASEAN inter-state relations [37].
After an initial phase of rejection and resentment, states in the region have become more amenable to the
idea of establishing cooperation on regional nuclear security. For instance, the successful formulation and
adoption of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (2007), which is binding and entered into
force in 2011 thanks to the leadership of Singapore and the signature of six ASEAN countries [45],
marked a clear departure from the “ASEAN way” and signaled the mounting political consensus among
ASEAN countries to tackle the problem of nuclear terrorism more explicitly13. Although it does not
directly cite UN Resolution 1540, the Convention makes reference to it when it declares the willingness
of ASEAN to cooperate "to prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border
control … [and] enhance intelligence exchange and sharing of information and enhance existing
cooperation towards developing regional databases under the purview of the relevant ASEAN bodies."

For instance, in 2003, the U.S. Congress commissioned a report in which it was noted with apprehension, “Southeast Asia with
its combination of large Muslim populations; dissident and separatist movements; porous borders and easy transnational
communication, under-resourced intelligence services … is a fertile breeding ground for terrorist operations” in M. Manyin,
“Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service Report for U.S. Congress, updated November 18, 2003 [41]. This
was followed by a congressional hearing in 2004 in which the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs,
James Kelly, explicitly stated: “this is a time of transition in Southeast Asia, and at the top of our policy priorities is waging the
war against terrorism.” James Kelly, Testimony before the United States House of Representatives, International Relations
Committee, June 2004 [42].
12 In January 2002, the U.S. administration formed the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to help the country fight
transnational and domestic terrorists. One operation led to the deployment of 660 U.S. marines in the Southern Philippines to
fight against the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf. Data related to Philippines-U.S. cooperation in the “war on terror” can be found in
James Putzel, Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the U.S-Philippines Alliance” [44].
13 The Convention deals with the problem of terrorism at large, however, it also has important repercussions for regional nuclear
governance, in that it refers to the need for ASEAN member states to “…. strengthen capability and readiness to deal with
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, cyber terrorism and any new forms of terrorism” [37].
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The adoption of the legally binding ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism certainly constitutes a
landmark step in developing a credible nuclear security infrastructure, but such an instrument in and of it
is not sufficient to drive much needed further changes. Furthermore, intra-regional commitment towards
more extensive and substantive institutional reforms continues to be subordinated to other development
priorities14. Progress in formulating and enforcing nuclear security policies and regulations is highly
uneven across the region. According to a recent report on the state of nuclear security in Southeast Asia,
“countries in the region remain deficient in areas of strategic trade management, equipping the borders to
prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials, training specialists and ensuring adequate
and sustainable financing of related activity”[40]. In addition, continued territorial disputes among
various member states has somewhat hampered closer cooperation on security matters in ASEAN. Most
recently, Thai and Cambodian forces clashed on their shared borders in February 2011. Compounding
this, “ASEAN’s Secretariat is significantly understaffed and nuclear security is not a priority for officials
working on wider security issues. As with any international organization, ASEAN’s agenda is set by its
member- states and the secretariat cannot work on issues that are not put forth or prioritized by the
members” [40].
For this reason, advancements to nuclear security continue to be promoted and lobbied for mostly by
external players such as the European Union (through its Centers of Excellence), the United States, and
the IAEA. These three actors are detached from intra-regional power-skirmish dynamics. The
sustainability of nuclear security policies might be in grave jeopardy if local ownership of such policies is
not properly fostered and enhanced.
Although the nuclear security regime of the region remains unsatisfactory, ASEAN and Europe have
developed the first regional binding agreement for disaster relief, preparedness, and prevention.
The region is not new to natural disasters15. Along with the process of regional integration, a culture of
cooperative disaster preparedness and relief has emerged. In fact, the first attempt to establish collective
infrastructure for disaster preparedness was made in 1971, when ASEAN established the ASEAN Experts
Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM), which was created to “enhance cooperation in disaster
management in order to minimize the adverse consequences of disasters on the economic and social
development of ASEAN member countries” [47]. However, this group met only once every two years and
had no independent resources and no enforcement mechanisms. Other institutions were then created in the
1990s to strengthen regional dialogue and information sharing. However, it was only in 2000, when
AEGDM was elevated to the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Disaster Management, that it acquired
more political status within the regional governance architecture. AEGDM also gained some additional
power to approve guidelines and standards of conduct to strengthen national disaster response policies.
The adoption of the Bali Concord in 2003 also prompted the development of regional disaster
infrastructure by widening and deepening the regional integration process.
The agreement fully embraces the concept of comprehensive security and “recognized that more intraregional cooperation is needed to handle concerns that are trans-boundary in nature and therefore shall be
addressed regionally in a holistic integrated and comprehensive manner” [46]. ASEAN adopted the
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) in 2005. The
evolution of the ASEAN community led to a new impetus, which strengthens the collective commitment
14

Several countries in Southeast Asia continue to oppose the adoption of a regional export control regulations and external
donors, such as the EU, work exclusively with individual states to help to formulate appropriate policies. In addition, protection
of critical maritime routes continues to be a challenge due to weak governance capacities and the increased level of piracy
activities. Yet little has been done at the regional level to address these challenges.
15 Angela Pennisi di Floristella argues, “Southeast Asia is one of the world’s most vulnerable regions to suffer from a range of
natural disasters. Over the last years, earthquakes, typhoons, the rise of the sea level, volcanic eruptions, droughts, heat waves
and tsunamis are becoming more frequent and severe” [46].
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to disaster preparedness and response through the creation of an ASEAN Humanitarian Center that was
later, created in 2011.
The development of this institutional architecture to cope with disasters has brought some important
innovation in the governance of the ASEAN region. These innovations influence the way in which
ASEAN approaches deals with nuclear security obligations. At least three significant changes in the
“ASEAN traditional governance modus operandi” have been brought about by the development of a
regional disaster management approach: 1) the development of a more consolidated and effective
mechanism for sharing information; 2) a critical shift in ASEAN attitude from reactive to proactive
governance; and 3) the strengthening of the norm of collective security.
Firstly, the current regional nuclear security infrastructure does not openly facilitate the sharing of
sensitive information among countries. However, the ASEAN approach to disaster response heavily relies
on the gathering of information and the continuous communication among member-states. For instance,
the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (2011) runs
offices in every Southeast Asian country. They conduct daily risk assessments made available to all
member-states. In return, each state is required to contribute and cooperate with the continuous collection
and update of data and the immediate disclosure of information that is critical for collective security.
Secondly, the establishment of a regional disaster-management infrastructure has prompted changes in the
regional ASEAN towards disasters, threats, and vulnerabilities. This change within ASEAN is at the early
stage but is nonetheless promising. According to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response (AADMER), each state has to allocate specific resources, both human and
financial, towards the conduction of risk assessment and the continuous evaluation of vulnerabilities
within member-state security and disaster response systems. Most specifically, AADMER has released
guidelines and interoperable protocols for identifying disaster risks in each member-state and for
coordinating the collection, storage, and analysis of risk data for formulating plans for dissemination of
regional risk information and assessment. The attention to risk and risk assessment has also led ASEAN
to devote significant resources to deliver training at the national and regional level to ensure commitment
to risk prevention and disaster preparedness. This has begun to generate a proactive culture of prevention
that was not present in the past. The Head of ASEAN Disaster Management Adelina Jamal noted: “one of
the main lessons learned… from experience of disasters is the need to be prepared for the unthinkable”
[46]. This shift in mentality and the orientation towards more proactive prevention policies will trickle
down to other sectors and will be particularly helpful in the realm of nuclear security.
Finally, a normative shift has begun to emerge in parallel with the formation of an ASEAN approach to
disaster management. This normative shift is underpinned by the norm of collective security that has to be
ensured at the expense of national sovereignty. It was noted earlier that in the field of disaster
management ASEAN has discontinued its usual consensual approach to regional governance and has
opted for hard- governance. AADMER is a binding treaty that enlists specific obligations and
commitments to adhering member-states. AADMER exercises a level of authority over member-states
that go way beyond other treaties. To appreciate the normative shift that AADMER embeds in Southeast
Asian regional governance a comparison with the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT)
must be seen.
ACCT espouses a soft-governance approach. The convention claims that it simply “shall provide a
framework for regional cooperation” [45] and includes a long list of areas for cooperation without ever
referring to specific actions that states are required to take to comply with the treaty. In addition, articles
II-III-IV-V and VII all provide the constraints and the limits of the convention by reinforcing the principle
of sovereignty and non-interference.
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Conversely, the language used in the drafting of AADMER is more authoritative over the compliance
responsibilities of states and is less defensive of national sovereignty. For instance, it has been noted in
Article III that AADMER reinforces the importance of territorial integrity and national unity.
Nonetheless, it asserts that “each affected party shall have the primary responsibility to respond to a
disaster occurring within its territory and external assistance or offers of assistance shall only be provided
upon the requires or with the consent of the affected Party” [36]. The choice of the word “primary”
implies that sovereignty remains an indispensable yet necessary pillar to ensure collective security in
disaster management. As previously noted, AADMER assigns clear responsibilities to states. For
instance, the agreement requires states “to establish, maintain and periodically review national disaster
early warning systems” to “identify disaster risks,” and to “communicate the information to the ASEAN
coordinating center for humanitarian center”.
Although the treaty does not yet propose any specific sanction for countries that fail to perform at the
level requested by the agreement, the tone and approach of the agreement constitute an indisputable step
towards hard governance and a more effective approach to regional governance.

V.

Towards a more holistic approach to nuclear security
governance?

This paper has sought to explain how and why the approach purported by a new type of institution in
disaster preparedness and response management organizations might ultimately benefit the regional and
global efforts towards the establishment of a cohesive global nuclear security framework.
As the paper has also suggested, it is important to note that currently DPRMOs work exclusively on
natural disasters. Their impact on the governance of nuclear security is indirect, seen through the
establishment of systems of early warning, risk assessment, and coordination processes that might
eventually facilitate and ease the process of regional nuclear security governance. However, DPRMOs
themselves might take on a more explicit role in nuclear security. Three main factors might facilitate the
expansion of their role in this domain: 1) the deepening of the regional integration process, 2) the
expanding support that these organizations will receive from the U.S. and other important players: 3) the
record of accomplishments and successes that these organizations will establish and provide the basis of
the credibility and legitimacy of their operation in other areas.
First and foremost, it is important to note that creation of DPRMOs is a process closely related to the
deepening of regional integration. As such, it is easy to envision that the further evolution of regional
cooperation will lead to an expansion of these DPRMOs to other sectors. Ultimately, the very existence of
this kind of organization shows that regional groupings have embraced a new and expanded
understanding of security as a collective and non-traditional endeavor. They represent an important
landmark in regional governance. The system of data gathering, collective and peer- review monitoring,
and daily information-sharing, will advance mutual trust and confidence among countries which will then
allow for the expansion of regional governance in other domains including the collective protection of
critical facilities. The second factor that might play a role in the enlargement of DPRMOs mandates on
nuclear security is the support that these organizations are receiving and will continue to enjoy from
powerful countries like the United States and the European Union. It is important to note that many of the
regional disaster-management mechanisms came about because of indigenous leadership within regional
groupings. This means that these systems enjoy high legitimacy and support among many member-states,
but the U.S. and the EU rely on external actors. . Given the slow progress that regional nuclear security
institutions are making, it is likely that these actors will eventually invest more resources in DPRMOs to
compensate for the poor performance of more conventional nuclear security organizations. Some
precedence in this regard has already taken place In 2004 the United States Command in the Gulf Region
hosted a workshop entitled “Combating Terrorism and Enhancing Regional Stability and Security
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Through Disaster Preparedness.” The workshop’s main goal was to strengthen regional capacities to
respond to potential man-made disasters, and nuclear terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, another rationale
underpinning the use of this disaster-preparedness approach was to foster a broader discussion about
establishing an enduring and credible collective defense system in the Gulf Region. In the “humanitarian
ethics of care” [48] on which DPRMO existence is premised provides the legitimacy to advance more
politically challenging conversations such as collective defense and security policies.16
Finally, there is little doubt that the most important factor that will likely determine whether DPRMOs
will take on an expanded mandate is the power of their demonstration effect, that is, the record of
accomplishments and successes they will acquire and be able to display in the area of disaster relief, early
warning, and risk prevention.
It is fair to ask, however, how reproducible is the contingency approach to nuclear security outside of the
Southeast Asia context. At the onset we have acknowledged that Southeast Asia presents favorable
conditions for the emergence of this new governance model alongside the creation of DPRMOs
institutions. Certainly the region as a whole features conducive elements and circumstances that have
allowed this type of governance to thrive. For instance, although power plays an important role in the
region, the power asymmetry among regional players is not as acute as in other contexts. In addition,
Southeast Asia has experience in innovative governance. ASEAN itself, the regional organization, has
emerged from a distinct consensus-based model of governance that is highly embedded in and largely
mirrors the specific cultural context of Southeast Asia. Yet these features might not be considered unique
exclusively to Southeast Asia. The emergence of less formal governance models rests on simple and
rather basic conditions such as: “strategic uncertainty, meaning that policy makers recognize that they
cannot reply on their strategic disposition to guide action in a particular domain and a multi- polar or
oligarchic distribution of power in which no single actor has the capacity to impose her own preferred
solution without taking into account the views of the others. Together these conditions open up the
possibility for transforming distributive bargaining into deliberative problem solving through the
institutional mechanisms of experimentalist governance” [50]
Finally, it is important to note that the work that conducted by DPRMOs does not and should not replace
the efforts that States have done to conduct the enduring weaknesses in the current global nuclear security
regime. The approach that DPRMOs adopt does present some shortcomings.
Firstly, the “disaster approach” to nuclear security does not offer a long-term approach to the governance
of nuclear infrastructures. It is a functional approach to monitor risks in the medium and short-term but it
does not offer a forward-looking perspective on the risks that might be generated through the evolution of
nuclear technology and the spread of nuclear power around the world. Secondly, and related to the first
point, this approach does not aim to solve the root causes that make systems more vulnerable to nuclear
terrorism in the first place. A disaster preparedness approach to nuclear security considers and tackles the
immediate roots of vulnerabilities but ultimately leaves unturned the very political economic and social
structures that led to the vulnerabilities in the first place. This means that through this approach we might
be able to mitigate and tame vulnerabilities in the short term but not fully address them.
Ultimately, the development of a comprehensive framework for nuclear security will rely on the
contribution of multiple actors: global nuclear institutions, states, as well as regional organizations.
Certainly, the establishment of regional disaster management systems brings new opportunities for
16

At the workshop on workshop entitled Combating Terrorism and Enhancing Regional Stability and Security Through Disaster
Preparedness, Colonel Hazza’a Mubarak Al Hajri, GCC Assistant Secretary For Security Affairs went on record to say that: “the
responsibility for handling emergency situations is a shared and comprehensive responsibility that cannot be undertaken by any
of the GCC countries alone – it is the responsibility of all the GCC countries. This is what we are all looking forward to through
this meeting, in order to achieve the wishes, aspirations and goals of our leaders and of our people” [49].
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institutional innovation and political momentum for further regional governance that if seized correctly,
might ultimately strengthen regional nuclear security infrastructures and positively influence the
establishment of a sustainable global nuclear security regime.
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